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Abstract
The power to coerce workers is important for the e¢ cient operation of hierarchically structured
organizations. However, this power can also be used by managers to exploit their subordinates
for their own benet. We examine the relationship between the power to coerce and exploitation
in a laboratory experiment where a senior and a junior player interact repeatedly for a nite
number of periods. We nd that senior players try repeatedly to use their power to exploit junior
workers. These attempts are successful only when junior workers have incomplete information
about how their e¤ort impacts on the earnings of senior players, but not when they have complete
information. Evidence from an incentive-compatible questionnaire indicates that the social
acceptability of exploitation depends on whether the junior worker can detect she is being
exploited. We also show how a history of exploitation a¤ects future interactions.
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1 Introduction
Hierarchy is a nearly ubiquitous form of organization. Large multinational rms, small businesses,
governmental agencies, and political parties are all hierarchically structured to some degree. A
hierarchy typically implies that some individuals have the power to issue orders to others and
punish those that disobey them. The power to coerce subordinates into taking specic actions
is regarded as essential for the e¢ cient operation of hierarchically structured organizations (e.g.,
Coleman, 1990; Day, 1963). However, individuals higher up in the hierarchy can abuse this power
to their own benet and exploit subordinates (e.g., Wertheimer, 1987).
The extent of exploitation in organizations is not precisely known. According to the European
Values Survey, 50.2 percent of respondents stated that they felt exploited at work, at least some-
times.1 What is known, however, is that the exploitation of workers entails signicant costs not
only for the workers, but also for the organizations. Apart from the signicant litigation costs,
exploitation has been linked to reductions in workersmorale and productivity (Bewley, 1999), and
to an increase in workplace aggression (Baron, Neuman and Geddes, 1999; Hoad, 1993). The latter
has been estimated to cost more than 1.75 million working days each year in the United States
(Bachman, 1994).
Despite the importance of the topic, empirical evidence on exploitation in organizations is rare.
This is partly due to the fact that exploitation is usually either illegal or socially unacceptable, and
thus hard to observe. Another important reason, however, is that it can be di¢ cult to determine
what constitutes exploitation in daily life. In general, exploitation can be dened as the act of
taking unfair advantage of another party (Wertheimer, 1996, 2008).2 However, determining what
constitutes unfair advantageis not always straightforward as this typically depends on the context
of an interaction and the history between the parties involved, which is often unobservable and
unveriable.
The paucity of empirical evidence implies that our knowledge regarding di¤erent factors that
may facilitate exploitation is limited. For this reason, in this paper, we present evidence from
a laboratory experiment exploring whether individuals use the power to coerce to exploit their
subordinates to their own benet and whether this depends on the ability of subordinates to detect
that they are being exploited. While the laboratory environment undoubtedly di¤ers in numerous
ways from that in the eld where exploitation occurs, it has the advantage that it allows one to
1The question on whether individuals felt exploited in their workplace was only included in the 1981 wave of the
European Values Survey. In the past decade, the number of lawsuits due to labor exploitation has been steadily
increasing (International Labour Organization, 2009).
2More specically, Wertheimer (1996, p.16) denes exploitation as follows: A exploits B when A takes unfair
advantage of B. Taking unfair advantage could be understood in two ways. First, it may refer to some dimension of
the outcome of the exploitative act or transaction, that is, the transaction is substantively unfair, and this, it seems
has two elements: (1) the benet to A and (2) the e¤ect on B. We may say that the benet to A is unfair because
it is wrong for A to benet at all from his act (e.g. by harming B) or because As benet is excessive relative to
the benet to B. Second, to say that A takes unfair advantage of B may imply that A has been able to turn some
characteristic of B or some feature of Bs situation to his or her advantage. We imply that there is some sort of defect
in the process by which the unfair outcome has come about or the formation of the agreement between A and B, for
example, that A has coerced B or defrauded B or has manipulated B.
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examine situations where it is easier to establish what constitutes fair treatment of a worker and,
thus, what constitutes exploitation. Another advantage of using laboratory experiments is that
they allow one to manipulate the environment to determine which factors may make exploitation
more likely. For similar reasons, laboratory experiments have been previously used to study issues
such as corruption, discrimination and favoritism for which eld data is also scarce (e.g., Abbink,
2006; Bernhard et al. 2006; Cameron et al. 2009; Castillo and Petrie, 2010).3
Our set up is as follows. A senior worker is placed in charge of a project. He must complete
the project together with a junior worker.4 The workers are equally e¢ cient and the more e¤ort
the junior worker exerts on the project, the less e¤ort the senior needs to exert. The senior worker
makes a suggestion about how much e¤ort the junior worker should exert. The junior worker is not
bound by this suggestion and can disobey the senior worker by choosing to exert a di¤erent level
of e¤ort. The senior worker observes the junior workers e¤ort and has the power to punish her.
He can use this power to try to ensure that the worker does not work less than he does, but he can
also use it to coerce the junior worker into working more than him. Therefore, our set up allows
us to establish a plausible benchmark for what constitutes fair treatment of the junior worker and
what can be dened as exploitation. Like in most organizations, in our experiment, the two workers
interact repeatedly for a nite number of periods. This implies that senior workers may have an
incentive to invest in coercing the junior worker into exerting unfairly high levels of e¤ort.
Our aim is to examine whether participants in the role of senior workers attempt to exploit
junior workers, whether junior workers obey senior workers, and whether senior workers punish
junior workers when they disobey their orders. We examine behavior under symmetric information,
where junior workers know when they are exploited, and under asymmetric information, where
the junior workers cannot detect exploitation. In addition, we employ a method developed by
Krupka and Weber (in press) that uses an incentive-compatible questionnaire to elicit participants
normative views against exploitation and coercion, and how these views are a¤ected by whether
information is symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, we explore the impact of past exploitation on
future outcomes. In particular, after senior and junior workers have interacted for a nite number
of periods, their roles are switched allowing us to explore how exploited workers behave when they
nd themselves in a position of power.
The experimental results indicate that participants in the role of senior workers systematically
attempt to exploit junior workers. These attempts are much more pronounced under asymmetric
information. In line with this behavior, responses to the incentive-compatible questionnaire indicate
that senior workers consider higher-than-fair levels of e¤ort more socially acceptable when there
is asymmetric information. This is presumably because junior workers do not know they are
3Laboratory experiments have also been used repeatedly to study topics in organizational economics. Some
prominent examples are the investigation of gift-exchange relationships between employers and workers (e.g. Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993), the adverse e¤ects of monitoring workers (e.g., Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), factors that
may facilitate coordination within rms (e.g., Brandts and Cooper, 2006; Weber, 2006), factors that may explain
delegation (Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber, 2010) and the impact of membership in organizational groups (Goette,
Hu¤man, Meier, and Sutter, in press).
4For simplicity, throughout the paper, we will refer to the senior worker as a he and the junior worker as a
she.
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being exploited. Despite the signicant amounts of punishment in both treatments, exploitation
is not successful under symmetric information as junior workers disobey the suggestions made by
senior workers. Exploitation is successful under asymmetric information, although the extent of
exploitation is small. The reason is that junior workers appear to anticipate that senior workers will
try to exploit their informational advantage and disobey their suggestions. Disobedience is punished
in both treatments, but substantially more under asymmetric information. As a consequence, junior
workers with incomplete information are not only signicantly worse o¤ than senior workers, but
also than junior workers who have complete information. Finally, we nd that junior workers that
have been exploited are more likely to attempt to exploit their subordinates when roles are reversed.
2 The experiment
2.1 The game
To address our research questions, we use a two-player, three-stage game. In stage one, the senior
worker (Player S) makes a nonbinding suggestion, s, regarding the e¤ort level that he would like
the junior worker (Player J) to choose in stage 2. In stage two, Player J is informed about the
level of e¤ort suggested by Player S. Since the suggestion by Player S is nonbinding, Player J may
choose any e¤ort level e 2 f0; 1; :::; 10g. The earnings of Player S are an increasing function of e
while the earnings of Player J are a decreasing function of e. Table 1 shows the pre-punishment
earnings (^i) of both players as a function of Player Js e¤ort.
Table 1: Playersearnings as a function of e¤ort chosen by Player J
e 0 1 2 3x 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
^S 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
^J 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4
Note:  denotes subgame-perfect solution for selfinterested players; x denotes subgame-perfect solution for inequality-
averse (Fehr-Schmidt) players with S > 1=4 (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
In stage three, Player S receives information about the level of e¤ort chosen by Player J and
the associated earnings for both players. Having received this information, Player S can assign
punishment points p 2 N which would reduce Player Js earnings. Reducing Player Js earnings is
costly for Player S who must sacrice 0.2 units for every 1 unit he wishes to reduce Js earnings.
That is, we employ a 1:5 fee-to-ne ratio, which should make punishment even more e¤ective than
usual.5 Player S cannot reduce Player Js earnings below 0, that is, p  ^J . Thus, the nal earnings
of both players at the end of a stage three are given by
5The fee-to-ne ratio was chosen so that punishment poses a non-negligable threat to the junior worker. In most
experiments allowing for punishment opportunities, the fee-to-ne ratio tends to be 1:3 (see e.g., Nikiforakis and
Normann, 2008).
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S = 12 + 2e  0:2p (1)
J = 24  2e  p: (2)
Note that, without punishment, the game is a constant-sum game and e¢ ciency concerns should
play no role. This was done in order to control for subjectsconcerns for e¢ ciency and simplify
the analysis of the data.6 Note also that an e¤ort level of 3 equates the earnings of Player S and
Player J. Given the saliency of equality in previous laboratory experiments and the fact that players
are randomly assigned their roles in the experiment, e = 3 could be regarded as the fair level of
e¤ort.Therefore, in line with Wertheirmers (1996, 2008) denition of exploitation, we will say
that Player S exploits Player J when e > 3. Accordingly, we will say that Player S attempts to
exploit Player J if he suggests that Player J chooses an e¤ort level greater than 3. Finally, we will
say that Player S coerces Player J if the latter disobeys Player S by choosing a lower level of e¤ort
than what was suggested by Player S and Player S punishes her.7
2.2 Experimental treatments
In the experiment, we investigate behavior in two treatment which di¤er with respect to the infor-
mation available to Player J. In the baseline treatment, which we will call SYM, both players have
symmetric information about the earnings functions of both players. In particular, the instructions
contain both rows of Table 1 and formulas (1) and (2). In treatment ASYM (for asymmetric in-
formation), Player S is completely informed about Player Js earnings function. However, Player J
knows only her own earnings function precisely (i.e. equation (1) and the ^Srow are not contained
in Player Js instructions). With respect to Player Ss earnings, Player J knows only that there is a
positive relationship between e and Player Ss earnings. This is common knowledge. Both players
know about the e¤ects and costs of punishment.
Participants in the experiment play the constituent game over 10 periods with the same partner.
Note that the use of a xed-matching protocol makes it possible for the senior to invest in
punishment by punishing heavily in early periods in order to obtain the desired e¤ort level. After
each period, players are informed of their earnings and that of their partner (S ; J).
2.3 Related experimental literature
The literature on exploitation is vast, mostly philosophical and spans di¤erent disciplines. A
thorough discussion of this literature is beyond our scope and would require a separate paper. The
6This is in line with Tormey (1974) who writes that Exploitation resembles a zero-sum game, viz. what the
exploiter gains, the exploitee loses; or, minimally, for the exploiter to gain, the exploitee must lose.(p.207-208).
7This denition is consistent with that of Wertheimer (1996, p. 26) who states: In general, A coerces B to do X
only if A proposes (threatens) to make B worse o¤ with reference to some baseline condition if B chooses not do X,
although specifying the appropriate baseline against which to measure the proposal can be a complicated matter.
We take the suggestion of Player S as the baseline.
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interested reader is referred to Wertheimer (1996, 2008). In this section, we review some related
studies that use laboratory experiments.
In some respects, our game is similar to the wellstudied ultimatum game. In both games there
are two players who negotiate the division of a xed surplus, and one of the two players has the
power to reduce the earnings of the other player. However, there are also a number of important
di¤erences between the two games. The three most important ones are the following: (1) Unlike in
the ultimatum game, the individual who proposes the division of the surplus (Player S) is also the
one who has the power to punish. The power to punish, therefore, can be used not only to prevent
unfairly low levels of e¤ort by Player J, but also to coerce her into exerting unfairly high levels
of e¤ort. In other words, the non-binding suggestion makes it possible for Player S to implicitly
express a threat of the form If you dont do as I say, then I will punish you.8 (2) The rst mover in
our game (Player S) has more power than the proposer (or the responder) in the ultimatum game.
A rejection in the ultimatum game leaves both parties with zero earnings. In contrast, maximal
punishment in our game would leave Player S with strictly positive earnings (and Player J with zero
earnings). We believe this is a realistic feature of asymmetric relationships in the workplace and
elsewhere. Third, unlike in our experiment, players in the ultimatum game are usually randomly
rematched in each period.
Despite these important di¤erences, experiments in ultimatum games provide important insights
about what one might expect to happen in our experiment. First, ultimatum games have established
that the majority of participants in laboratory experiments have an aversion towards being taken
advantage of and are thus willing to reject low o¤ers (see e.g. Camerer, 2003). In anticipation
of this, most o¤ers tend to divide the surplus equally. However, when responders cannot monitor
the fairness of the proposers o¤ers, the latter make low o¤ers relative to when responders can
observe the earnings of both players (Croson, 1996; Kagel, Kim, and Moser, 1996; Güth, Huck,
and Ockenfels, 1996; Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; Rapoport and Sundali, 1996; Rapoport, Sundali,
and Seale, 1996; Schmitt, 2004; Straub and Murnighan, 1995). In general, responders accept these
o¤ers.
These ndings suggest that participants in the role of Player S may try to exploit Player J. The
latter may resist exploitation when there is symmetric information, but may allowto be exploited
when she lacks information about the earnings of Player S. However, this need not be the case.
First, unlike in our experiment where Player J has no information whatsoever about the earnings
of Player S (in the ASYM treatment), responders in the aforementioned studies, know the possible
realizations of the surplus and the probability distribution. This implies that they can make some
inferences about whether the proposer is trying to exploit his informational advantage. Second,
since the aforementioned ultimatum games do not involve repeated interactions, proposers do not
have an incentive to invest in building a reputation; therefore, their o¤ers reect what they think
responders will accept. In contrast, in our experiment, Player S has an incentive to suggest high
8Suggestions have been also shown to a¤ect behavior even when not backed by a punishment threat. In a recent
experiment, Andreoni and Rao (in press) show that if a receiver in a dictator game can suggest to the sender how
much he should send, sending increases signicantly.
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levels of e¤ort and then punish Player J if they disobey their demands in order to achieve higher
earnings in later rounds even under symmetric information. Our study therefore goes further by
examining not only whether participants in the role of Player S attempt to exploit Player J, but
also whether they are ready to coerce Player J in exerting higher levels of e¤ort, and Player Js
reaction.
The study most closely related to ours is that by Bolle, Breitmoser, and Schlächter (in press)
who study extortion in a laboratory experiment using a nitely-repeated game between two players
with symmetric information. In the rst stage of the game, the rst mover demands part of the
other players endowment. If the second mover accepts the demand in the second stage, then the
game ends. If he rejects it, then the rst mover can punish him. The threat posed by punishment is
formidable. The rst mover has to pay a xed fee for punishing the second mover (25 percent of his
endowment) and can reduce the latters earnings by as much as he wishes. The authors nd that
the majority of demands implement equal earnings for the two players. Also, rst movers are more
likely to use maximal punishment. As a result, the probability their demand is accepted increases
over time even though rst movers become more demanding over the course of the experiment.
There are a number of di¤erences between Bolle et al. (in press) and our study. First, Bolle
et al. study behavior only under symmetric information, and not under asymmetric information.
Second, there is a di¤erence in the intial conditions, which could be important as it may a¤ect
subjectsviews on what they are entitled to, their interpretation of the other players intentions,
and the norms governing behavior.9 Third, the punishment technology in Bolle et al. is much more
severe than in our experiment. At the extreme, the fee-to-ne ratio is 1:16 compared to 1:5 in our
experiment. Finally, we study how a history of exploitation a¤ects the relationship between Player
S and J in future interactions when roles are reversed, and also elicit norms against exploitation
using an incentive-compatible questionnaire, as we discuss below.
2.4 Path dependence
The experiment is divided into three parts. In Part 1, subjects play the game described in section
2.1. We are also interested to examine how past attempts to exploit Player J a¤ect her behavior
in the future. Does Player J retaliate when she has been coerced and exploited by Player S or
does she let by-gones be by-gones? How does Player S react? This is an interesting question as in
many organizations some young, talented and energetic employees advance more quickly through
the ranks than others and ultimately nd themselves in a position of relative power.10 For this
9 In particular, in Bolle et al. (in press), players are given endowments and the rst mover can try to appropriate
some of the second movers endowment. This is the reason why Bolle et al.s study is one of extortion. In our
experiment, subjects are not given endowments. The rst mover (Player S) simply suggests a level of e¤ort. All else
equal, we would expect second movers in our experiment to be more likely to accept the rst movers demands.
10This can certainly happen in academia. For example, consider a full professor who wishes to o¤-load a large
undergraduate class to a new assistant professor. Although the suggestion is formally nonbinding, the assistant
professor realizes that various punishment possibilities are available to the senior (e.g. tenure decision). However,
the assistant professor will eventually be promoted and may even become the head of the department which gives
him power over the old professor. While this may take a few years, in other organizations where the age di¤erence
between employees is smaller, the power reversal may happen more quickly.
6
purpose, in Part 2 of the experiment, subjectsroles are reversed. Participants are not aware about
the existence of Part 2, until Part 1 is completed.11
Part 2 of the experiment is identical in both treatments SYM and ASYM. That is, players have
symmetric information in both cases. In Part 2, it is common knowledge that participants will play
another 10 periods of the constituent game with their partners from Part 1.
2.5 Norms against exploitation and coercion
In the introduction, we stated our belief that exploitation is often socially unacceptable. Therefore,
it is reasonable to expect that participants behavior may be driven, at least partly, by norms
against exploitation and coercion. To examine whether this is the case, whether participants hold
similar views regarding the moral aspects underlying our game and how these views are a¤ected
by the information available to Player J, we elicit their views on the social acceptability of various
hypothetical choices of e¤ort levels and punishments in the third and nal part of the experiment.
Participants are informed about Part 3 at the end of Part 2 and are told that this would be the
nal part of the experiment.
To elicit social norms against exploitation and coercion, we follow a procedure introduced by
Krupka and Weber (in press).12 Depending on the treatment, each participant is asked to character-
ize the suggestions of a hypothetical Player S (Adam) in Part 1 or the suggestions of a hypothetical
Player J (Bob) in Part 2 as (1) very socially acceptable, (2) somewhat socially acceptable, (3) some-
what socially unacceptable, or (4) very socially unacceptable.13 For example, questions regarding
Part 1 are:
Suppose in Part 1, Bob knows exactly how Adams earnings depend on Bobs e¤ort
choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of (3 or 5). How socially acceptable
is Adams demand?
In the ASYM treatment two additional questions are asked:
Suppose in Part 1, Bob does NOT know how Adams earnings depend on Bobs e¤ort
choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of (3 or 5). How socially acceptable
is Adams demand?
A question regarding Part 2 is:
11The instructions read You may receive further instructions later. If you do, please read those also carefully.
The instructions for Part 2, however, explicitly said that the nal Part 3 contains only a questionnaire.
12This method was also used recently by Burks and Krupka (in press) to investigate ethical norms in di¤erent steps
of the hierarchy in a large nancial services rm. Amongst other things, Burks and Krupka nd that disagreement
in views regarding ethical behavior can explain factors such as job dissatisfaction.
13 In the experimental instructions, participants were told the following with regards to what is meant by socially
acceptable. By socially acceptable, we mean decisions that most people would consider acceptable. A decision
would be socially unacceptable if most people would consider it unacceptable.
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In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. Bob chose an e¤ort level of 3.
Adam reduced Bobs earnings until nally Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked
Adam to choose an e¤ort level of (5 or 7). How socially acceptable is Bobs demand?
Following Krupka and Weber (in press), one of the questions is randomly selected at the end of
the experiment. If a participants answer matches that given by the majority of other participants
in the experimental session, then he receives 5 Australian dollars (AUD) on top of his earnings
from Part 1 and Part 2. If his answer does not match the majority answer, he receives nothing.
The payment scheme provides individuals with incentives to reveal their beliefs about how socially
acceptable a certain action is considered to be by the majority of participants in the experiment.
Since social norms may be dened as shared perceptions, among members of a population regarding
the appropriateness of di¤erent behaviors(Krupka and Weber, in press, p.4), the answers to the
questionnaire should reveal the existence and content of norms against exploitation and coercion.
The entire list of questions can be found in the appendix.
2.6 Experimental procedures
The experiments was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of
Melbourne between December 2009 and March 2010, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Two ses-
sions, each with 20 participants, were conducted for each treatment. Each session lasted approx-
imately one hour forty-ve minutes. Participants were invited from a database of approximately
2500 registered volunteer students using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
Prior to entering the laboratory, each participant drew randomly a number from a hat. The
number determined the participantsseat in the laboratory, their role in Part 1 of the experiment
and their partner the identity of whom was not revealed at any time before or after the experiment.
Participants were then asked to read the instructions for Part 1. After reading the instructions for
Part 1 (and later Part 2) participants completed a control questionnaire to check if they understood
the instructions. Once all participants answers were checked the experiment commenced. The
instructions for Part 2 were distributed at the conclusion of Part 1. Similarly, the instructions of
Part 3 were distributed at the end of Part 2.
Previous studies provide evidence suggesting that participants may behave in a more socially
acceptable way (i.e., not attempt to exploit or coerce their subordinates) if the experimenter can
identify their actions from their earnings (e.g., Ho¤man et al., 1994). In order to minimize possible
experimenter-demand e¤ects, we used a double-blind protocol. One participant was assigned the
role of the monitorbased on the hat draw. The job of the monitor was to pay the participants
at the end of the experiment. The experimenter was not present during the payment. Participants
were told that the monitor would not read the instructions for Part 1 (and later for parts 2 and 3).
Thus, the monitor was completely unaware about the game and could not infer whether participants
behaved in a socially acceptable way; indeed, they could not even infer whether there was such a
dimension to the experiment. The monitor only read a general set of instructions which was also
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provided to the other participants.
Earnings from the experiment were in Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) where 9 EMU =
1 Australian Dollar (AUD). Average earnings from the experiment amounted to approximately
40 AUD (or 22.85 AUD per hour). At the time of the experiment, the minimum national hourly
wage rate was 14.31 AUD and the exchange rate between the Australian and the US Dollar was
approximately 1. The monitor received a xed payment of 30 AUD for assistance.
2.7 Behavioral hypotheses
We solve the 10-times repeated game by backward induction for two di¤erent behavioral assump-
tions. Assume rst that it is common knowledge that players are only interested in their own
material payo¤s. Then there will be no punishment on the third stage as punishment reduces the
earnings for Player S (i.e., p = 0). Hence, on the second stage, Player J will choose the minimal
e¤ort of e = 0. On the rst stage, Player S may make any suggestion regarding the desired e¤ort
level since this is only cheap talk. The resulting earnings are S = 12 and J = 24: This predic-
tion holds under both symmetric and asymmetric information (i.e., both in treatments SYM and
ASYM). Since this is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game, a well-known
result (see e.g. Oechssler, 2011) implies that the 10-period game has a unique subgame-perfect equi-
librium which consists of playing the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game
in every period.
Let us now assume that players dislike inequality in earnings. In particular, let us assume
Fehr-Schmidt preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The utility of player i is given by
ui = i   imax [j  i; 0]  imax [i  j ; 0] ; (3)
with 0  i < 1 and i  i. This model is a natural choice for our purposes as it assumes that
(some) players may dislike being treated unfairly.
As pointed out by Oechssler (2011), when a constituent game is repeated a nite number of
times with social preferences, one cannot rely, in general, on the above result since preferences are
interdependent across periods. This is why we have to use the sum of payo¤s i =
P
t 
t
i in (3).
Consider rst the case of symmetric information. We solve the repeated game by backward
induction. Consider stage 3 of the last period. Given that 5 units of punishment reduce J by 5
and S by 1, the payo¤ di¤erence is being reduced by 4. Hence, if S > 1=4; Player S will use
punishment to reduce as much as possible the inequality in material payo¤s, that is, he will try
to minimize the second term in (3). This implies that there will be no punishment, if payo¤s are
(weakly) in favor of Player S because punishment would only increase the payo¤ di¤erence between
Player S and Player J and would therefore never be used for any S  0. Assuming Player J knows
that S > 1=4 and that she considers her own earnings as more important than that of Player S
(i.e., J < 1=2), her best response on stage 2 is to choose an e¤ort such that payo¤s are as equal
9
as possible.14 Intuitively, it is better for Player J to equalize payo¤s herself rather than wait for
Player S to equalize payo¤s through punishment. In particular, if earnings so far have been equal,
Player J will choose e = 3. Again, Player S may demand any level of e¤ort in stage 1.
Given this behavior in the last period, players will behave accordingly in the second to last
period etc. In this way, one can check that there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which
Player J chooses an e¤ort of e = 3 in each period and Player S does not punish unless e < 3. The
resulting earnings in the constituent game are S = 18 and J = 18:
Under asymmetric information, if Player S is su¢ ciently averse to disadvantageous inequality
(i.e., S > 1=4), having complete information about the earnings of both players, he will punish
Player J to equalize payo¤s: However, Player J has no information about how her e¤ort impacts
the earnings of Player S. Therefore, we cannot o¤er a clear prediction about how asymmetric
information may a¤ect outcomes if players are inequality averse. However, based on the evidence
discussed in section 2.3, we expect Player S to be more likely to attempt to exploit Player J in
ASYM than in SYM.
To summarize, both theories predict that e  3: Punishment is only predicted by the Fehr-
Schmidt model when e < 3 and Player S cares su¢ ciently about disadvantageous inequality (i.e.,
S > 1=4). Punishment is predicted to be unrelated to the suggestions made by Player S.
3 Results
Result 1: Player S attempts to exploit Player J in both treatments. Attempts to exploit are more
pronounced under asymmetric information.
14 If Player J is su¢ ciently concerned about inequality in her favor (i.e., J > 1=2), she would choose an e¤ort to
equalize payo¤s without the threat of punishment (i.e. even if S < 1=4).
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Figure 1 - Suggestions made by Player S in Part 1
SUPPORT: Figure 1 presents a histogram with the suggestions made by participants assigned the
role of Player S in the rst part of the experiment (periods 1-10) in each treatment. Suggestions
are visibly higher in ASYM than in SYM. The average (median) suggestion is 4.66 (4) in SYM and
6.35 (6) in ASYM. The modal suggestion is 3 in SYM and 6 in ASYM. The di¤erence is statistically
signicant using the average suggestion across periods 1-10 in each group as an independent obser-
vation (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value < 0:01). The di¤erence in suggestions is apparent even
in period 1 (4.65 in SYM and 6.20 in ASYM; Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:03), showing
that participants in the role of Player S understand incentives in the game and that they are willing
to use the informational advantage to their benet. Suggestions remain fairly stable across the ten
periods in Part 1 (Spearman:  =  0:03; p-value = 0:93 for SYM;  =  0:10; p-value = 0:79 for
ASYM).
The data summarized in Figure 1 are somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, they indicate
clearly that most participants in the role of Player S are not concerned much about (advantageous)
inequalities in earnings as they attempt to exploit their informational advantage in ASYM to earn
higher amounts than Player J. On the other hand, however, participants make fairly low suggestions
under symmetric information, despite the fact that they can coerce Player J into exerting higher
e¤ort. Why is this? One possibility is that subjectsbehavior is a¤ected by social norms related to
exploitation, and that the norms prescribe di¤erent actions under di¤erent information conditions.
Therefore, before we examine the e¤ort exerted by Player J, we take a look at the answers to
the norm questionnaire. What level of e¤ort do individuals in the role of Player S believe to be
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socially acceptable and what level to be socially unacceptable? Most participants in the role of
Player S in both treatments nd an e¤ort of 3 (the level that equalizes pre-punishment earnings)
to be very socially acceptable.15 More interestingly, however, is the response to the question how
socially acceptable do those in the role of Player S nd e¤ort levels of 5, which imply ^S > ^J .
The average rank is 2.30 in SYM and 1.45 in ASYM. The di¤erence is statistically signicant
(Mann-Whitney, p-value < 0:01). These responses indicate that those in the role of Player S in
treatment ASYM believe that when exploitation cannot be detected it is less socially unacceptable.
This is presumably because Player J does not feel that she is being exploited. This provides an
explanation for the more frequent attempts to exploit in Part 1 which, to our knowledge, has not
been previously documented in the literature.
Result 2: On average, attempts to exploit are unsuccessful under symmetric information. Player
S succeeds in exploiting Player J under asymmetric information, but the extent of exploitation
is relatively small. Nevertheless, those in the role of Player J are worse o¤ under asymmetric
information than under symmetric information.
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Figure 2 E¤ort exerted by Player J in Part 1
SUPPORT: The average (median) e¤ort level is 3.03 (3) in SYM and 3.64 (4) in ASYM. The
di¤erence is (weakly) signicant (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:07). Further, using the
15The answers were coded as 1 for very socially acceptable, 2 for somewhat socially acceptable, 3 for somewhat
socially unacceptable, and 4 for very socially unacceptable. In particular, all participants in the role of Player
S in treatment SYM said that an e¤ort of 3 is very socially acceptable (average rank = 1). Similarly, 75 percent of
those assigned the role of Player S in ASYM said that an e¤ort of 3 is very socially acceptable while a further 15
percent said that it was somewhat socially acceptable (average rank = 1:35). Despite being small in magnitude, the
di¤erence is statistically signicant (Mann-Whitney, p-value = 0:02).
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average e¤ort level in each group in periods 1-10 as an independent observation, we fail to reject
the hypothesis that the e¤ort level in SYM is signicantly di¤erent from 3, which would equalize
the earnings of Player S and J (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two tailed, p value = 0:49). Thus,
according to our denition, we do not detect exploitation in the SYM treatment. In contrast, the
average e¤ort level in ASYM is signicantly higher than 3 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two tailed,
p value = 0:03) and documents at least a mild form of exploitation. E¤ort levels remain fairly
stable across the ten periods in Part 1 (Spearman:  = 0:20; p-value = 0:59 for SYM;  =  0:28;
p-value = 0:44 for ASYM).
The result of exploitation is that the pre-punishment earnings of senior subjects in the rst part
of the experiment are 19.28 EMU, while that of junior subjects are 16.72 EMU. This di¤erence
is (weakly) statistically signicant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, p-value = 0:09). The
di¤erence in pre-punishment earnings of senior and junior subjects in SYM is negligible (18.05
EMU and 17.95 EMU for senior and junior subjects, respectively) and not statistically signicant
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, two-tailed, p-value = 0:81). The post-punishment earnings of junior
subjects in ASYM (12.41 EMU) are signicantly lower than those of junior subjects in SYM (15.46;
Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value < 0:01).
Result 3: The reason exploitation is relatively small under asymmetric information is that those
in the role of Player J seem to anticipate that Player S will try to exploit them and are less likely
to follow the suggestions made by Player S.
SUPPORT: We dene e¤ort deviation as the di¤erence between the suggestion by Player S and
the e¤ort exerted by Player J. E¤ort deviation is a measure of disobedience.16 The average e¤ort
deviation in periods 1-10 is 1.63 in SYM and 2.72 in ASYM. Using the average of each group
in periods 1-10, we nd that the di¤erence across treatments is statistically signicant (Mann-
Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:04). Those in the role of Player J seem to anticipate that Player S
will attempt to use the asymmetric information to their advantage already in the rst period. The
average e¤ort deviation in period 1 is 1.80 in SYM and 2.55 in ASYM (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed,
p-value = 0:11). Even though suggestions are higher in the ASYM than in the SYM treatment,
Player Js greater willingness to disobey Player S in the ASYM treatment seems surprising, given
that Player J does not have any information about Player Ss earnings.
According to the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2.7, suggestions (or disobedience)
should not be correlated with punishment. However, as the next result shows, this turns out not
to be the case.
Result 4: In both treatments, Player S coerces Player J by punishing her when she disobeys his
suggestion. Coercion is substantially more severe under asymmetric information, even when we
16As one would expect, e¤ort deviation is almost always positive or zero, i.e., Player J almost never exerts e¤ort
higher than what was suggested to them. In particular, out of 200 observations (20 groups * 10 periods) in the rst
part of the experiment in each treatment, there are only 6 instances of negative e¤ort deviation all of which occurred
in SYM.
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control for the extent of disobedience. Coercion does not have a positive e¤ect on e¤ort under
symmetric information and is counter-productive under asymmetric information.
SUPPORT: Most participants in the role of Player S use punishment at some point in Part 1. In
particular, 15 of the 20 senior subjects punish at least once in SYM and 18 out of 20 senior subjects
do so in ASYM. The average number of punishment points assigned is larger in ASYM than in
SYM (4.10 versus 2.49). This is a sizeable di¤erence suggesting that participants in ASYM are
willing to coerce those in the role of Player J into exerting higher levels of e¤ort. However, this
may be a premature conclusion if this di¤erence is driven by the greater extent of disobedience in
ASYM (see Result 3).
Table 2: What determines punishment? Random e¤ects regression
dependent variable: punishment points coe¤. std. error
e¤ort deviation (s  e) 0:87 0:16
e¤ort  1:34 0:21
period 0:07 0:10
ASYM 5:26 1:81
ASYM * e¤ort deviation  0:41 0:24
ASYM * e¤ort  0:40 0:29
ASYM * period  0:22 0:14
constant 4:73 1:12
Note: ; ; signicant at 1%, 5%, 10% level; R2 = :43; N = 400:
Table 2 presents the results from a regression analysis on the determinants of punishment. The
dependent variable is the number of punishment points that Player S assigned to Player J in period
t. The independent variables are: e¤ort deviation the di¤erence between the suggestion made by
Player S and the e¤ort chosen by Player J; e¤ort the level of e¤ort exerted by Player J in period
t; period a variable controlling for possible time trends; ASYM a treatment dummy taking the
value of 1 if the observation comes from the ASYM treatment and 0 otherwise. We also include the
interaction of the rst three variables with the treatment dummy. The empirical model controls for
individual random e¤ects taking into account the fact that each individual makes repeated decisions
regarding punishment.
The most interesting nding in Table 2 is that, even when controlling for the extent of disobedi-
ence, punishment is substantially and signicantly higher in ASYM than in SYM. This can be seen
by the highly signicant and sizable treatment dummy for ASYM. This suggests that participants
in the role of Player S use the asymmetric information to force Player J to exert higher levels of
e¤ort. Table 2 also shows that disobeying Player S by choosing a level of e¤ort below what was
suggested is punished in both treatments, but even more so in SYM.17 As one would expect, the
higher the level of e¤ort exerted by Player J the less is the punishment that is meted out. The
insignicance of the variable ASYM * e¤ort indicates that lower e¤ort is not punished more in
17 If we run the same regression for the ASYM treatment only, the coe¢ cient for e¤ort deviation is 0.44 and has a
p-value of 0.03. Therefore, disobedience is punished in both treatments.
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ASYM than in SYM.
Table 3 presents the results from regressions analyzing the determinants of e¤ort exerted by
Player J. The dependent variable is the e¤ort exerted in period t. The independent variables are
Suggestion in t by Player S, Punishment in t   1, i.e., the number of points Player S assigned to
Player J in the previous period, and Period: Again, the regression controls for individual random
e¤ects. The results indicate that Player J responds strongly to the suggestion made by Player S.
The e¤ect of past punishment is not signicantly di¤erent from zero in SYM. In ASYM, punishment
even has a (weakly signicant) negative e¤ect. It thus resembles the counter-productive e¤ect of
punishment seen in previous studies (e.g. Bolle et al., in press; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Fehr
and Rockenbach, 2003; Nikiforakis, 2008).
Table 3: What determines e¤ort? Random e¤ect regression
dependent variable: ASYM SYM
e¤ort in t coe¤. std. error coe¤. std. error
suggestion in t 0:29 0:08 0:31 0:06
punishment in t  1  0:04 0:02  0:02 0:02
period  0:03 0:05  0:00 0:04
constant 2:17 0:67 1:65 0:44
Note: ; ; signicant at 1%, 5%, 10% level; R2 = :10; N = 180:
We next turn our attention to behavior in the second part of the experiment after roles are
reversed. In SYM, the role reversal does not reveal any new information about the payo¤s realized
by the senior subjects in periods 1-10. In contrast, in ASYM, junior subjects learn the extent to
which they have been exploited. We are interested to see to what extent behavior in periods 1-10
a¤ects outcomes in periods 11-20.
Result 5: Behavior in Part 2 is signicantly determined by the outcomes in Part 1 in ASYM.
There is a similar, but weaker, relationship in SYM.
SUPPORT: Figures 3a and 3b presents the relationship between e¤ort exerted by Player J in periods
1-10 and that exerted by Player S in periods 11-20. Each observation represents the average e¤ort
in a group in periods 1-10 and the average e¤ort in periods 11-20. The two lines represent the
45-degree line and a tted regression line. As can be seen, there is a clear positive relationship
in ASYM. The relationship is weaker in SYM, although clearly e¤ort in the second part of the
experiment is still similar to that in the rst part in some groups. To assess the strength of the
relationship we ran an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the average e¤ort in periods
11-20. The independent variable is the average e¤ort in periods 1-10. The relationship is highly
signicant in ASYM (coe¢ cient: 0.68; p-value < 0:01), but not in SYM (coe¢ cient: 0.13; p-value
= 0:44).18 These ndings suggest that by-gones are not by-gones.
18One group in SYM appears to be an outlier with an average e¤ort close to 7 in the rst part and below 3 in the
second part. If we run the regression excluding this group, the relationship becomes signicant, although it is still
weaker than in ASYM (coe¢ cient: 0.53; p value = 0:03).
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Figure 3a - E¤ort in Parts 1 and 2 in treatment SYM
Figure 3b - E¤ort in Parts 1 and 2 in treatment ASYM
In order to understand behavior in Part 2 and how it relates to that in Part 1, we take a look
at the responses provided by individuals in the role of Player J in the norm questionnaire. The
answers illustrate that, in both treatments, those in the role of Player J consider an eye for an
eyeto be socially acceptable and two eyes for an eyeto be socially unacceptable. We also nd
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that letting by-gones be by-gonesis as socially acceptable as an eye for an eye. In particular,
individuals were asked three questions:
In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. (Bob did not know how his e¤ort
will a¤ect Adams earnings ASYM only.) Bob chose an e¤ort level of 3. Adam reduced Bobs
earnings until nally Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an e¤ort level
of 5. How socially acceptable is Bobs demand?
In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. (Bob did not know how his e¤ort
will a¤ect Adams earnings ASYM only.) Bob chose an e¤ort level of 3. Adam reduced Bobs
earnings until nally Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an e¤ort level
of 7 instead. How socially acceptable is Bobs demand?
In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an e¤ort level of 5. (Bob did not know how his e¤ort
will a¤ect Adams earnings ASYM only.) Bob chose an e¤ort level of 5. Adam did not reduce
Bobs earnings. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an e¤ort level of 3 instead. How socially
acceptable is Bobs demand?
Again answers were coded as 1 for very socially acceptable, 2 for somewhat socially accept-
able, 3 for somewhat socially unacceptable, and 4 for very socially unacceptable. The average
rank for the rst question is 1.60 and 1.65 for SYM and ASYM, respectively. The average rank
for the second question is 3.10 and 3.05 for SYM and ASYM, respectively. The average rank for
the third question is 1.55 and 1.70 for SYM and ASYM, respectively. None of the three di¤er-
ences across treatments are statistically signicant using a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test (p-values
> 0:65). The average rank is signicantly higher in the second question than in the rst question
using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test (p-value < 0:01 for both SYM and ASYM) suggesting that an
eye for an eyeis more socially acceptable than two eyes for an eye. Also, the average rank is sig-
nicantly lower in the third question than in the second question again using a two-tailed Wilcoxon
test (p-value < 0:01 for both SYM and ASYM) suggesting that letting by-gones be by-gones in the
absence of coercion is more socially acceptable than two eyes for an eye. However, the average
rank is not signicantly di¤erent in the rst and third questions using a two-tailed Wilcoxon test
(p-value > 0:74).
It is also interesting to examine the relationship between post-punishment earnings in the rst
and second part of the experiment. Post-punishment earnings reveal the extent of inequality be-
tween Player S and Player J, but also, given the evidence just presented on e¤ort, the extent of
punishment. Figure 4 plots the di¤erence in the average post-punishment earnings between Player
S and Player J in the rst and second part. The gure illustrates that Player S earns more than
Player J in both treatments in Part 1, while the opposite happens in Part 2. It also depicts that
the di¤erence in earnings is greater under asymmetric information. Finally, it reveals that the
outcomes in the rst part of the experiment are positively correlated with the outcomes in the
second part under asymmetric information. The relationship is again weaker in SYM. To assess
the strength of the relationship we ran an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the average
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di¤erence in earnings in periods 11-20. The independent variable is the average e¤ort in periods
1-10. The relationship is highly signicant in ASYM (coe¢ cient: 0.75; p value < 0:01), but not in
SYM (coe¢ cient: 0.27; p-value = 0:15).
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What makes these results interesting is the fact that subjects have symmetric information in
both treatments in the second part. Exploitation in the rst part clearly a¤ects outcomes in the
second part in ASYM. Nevertheless, e¤ort in the second part is not signicantly di¤erent across
treatments (Mann-Whitney, two-tailed, p-value = 0:83). Also, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the average e¤ort of 3.10 in SYM and 3.37 in ASYM is the same as the fair e¤ort level of 3
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, two-tailed, p-value > 0:46).
4 Conclusion
We have designed a game in which exploitation can result from the hierarchical relationship between
players and, in particular, from the fact that the senior worker has the power to coerce a junior
worker into exerting high levels of e¤ort. Using a laboratory experiment, we nd that senior
workers often attempt to exploit junior workers, asking them to exert high levels of e¤ort. This
occurs both when junior workers have complete information about how their e¤ort a¤ect the senior
workers earnings, and when they have incomplete information about how their e¤ort a¤ects the
earnings of the senior worker. These attempts, however, are more frequent and pronounced under
incomplete information. The evidence collected from an incentive-compatible questionnaire used
to elicit norms against exploitation suggests an explanation for this behavior: senior workers seem
to consider small levels of exploitation as socially acceptable when junior workers cannot detect
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they are being exploited. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical evidence that the
content of norms may depend on the information that individuals have at their disposal.
The attempts to exploit junior workers are unsuccessful under complete information. The
reason is that most junior workers disobey suggestions by senior workers to exert an e¤ort that
would imply unequal earnings for senior and junior workers, despite the threat of being punished.
Interestingly, junior workers disobey senior workers even when they have incomplete information.
This is presumably because they anticipate that senior workers will try to exploit their informational
advantage. The result is that, while exploitation is successful under asymmetric information, its
extent is small. Most senior workers attempt to coerce junior workers into exerting high levels
of e¤ort under both informational conditions by investing signicant amounts in punishing junior
workers when the latter show disobedience. The willingness to coerce junior workers is more
pronounced under asymmetric information, but coercion is counter-productive as it tends to reduce
the level of e¤ort in subsequent periods. The result of exploitation and coercion is that junior
workers are substantially worse o¤ in monetary terms under asymmetric information than under
symmetric information.
What do our results imply for exploitation in organizations? As mentioned in the introduction,
our laboratory experiment controls for a number of factors that could a¤ect the willingness of
managers to exploit their subordinates in daily life. For this reason, generalizations should be made
with care. We believe our ndings suggest that exploitation may be more likely in organizations in
which workers have little information about the product of their e¤orts relative to their managers.
Greater transparency in these cases could limit the extent of exploitation, not only because workers
will be more likely to resist exploitation, but also because managers may be less willing to act in a
way that would be socially unacceptable.
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Appendix 
    
    Table A.1 — Summary statistics from questionnaire in Part 3 
Questions SYM treatment ASYM treatment 
Mean Mode Mean Mode
 
1. Suppose in Part 1, Bob knows exactly how Adam's earnings depend 
on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. 
How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
1.05 
(0.22) 
1 1.23 
(0.42) 
1 
 
2. Suppose in Part 1, Bob knows exactly how Adam's earnings depend 
on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. 
How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
2.20 
(0.67) 
2 2.05 
(0.75) 
2 
 
3. Suppose in Part 1, Bob does NOT know how Adam's earnings 
depend on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort 
level of 3. How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
Not 
asked 
Not 
asked 
1.38 
(0.63) 1 
 
4. Suppose in Part 1, Bob does NOT know how Adam's earnings 
depend on Bob's effort choice. Adam asked Bob to choose an effort 
level of 5. How socially acceptable is Adam's demand? 
Not 
asked 
Not 
asked 
1.53 
(0.60) 1 
 
5*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam reduced Bob's earnings until finally 
Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort 
level of 5. How socially acceptable is Bob's demand? 
1.55 
(0.75) 1 
1.57 
(0.78) 1 
6*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam reduced Bob's earnings until finally 
Bob chose a level of 5. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort 
level of 7 instead. How socially acceptable is Bob's demand? 
2.93 
(0.73) 
3 2.88 
(0.79) 
3 
7*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 3. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
1.05 
(0.22) 1 
1.15 
(0.53) 1 
 
8*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 5 instead. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
2.73 
(0.51) 
3 2.60 
(0.78) 
3 
 
9*. In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 3. Bob 
chose an effort level of 3. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 7 instead. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
3.63 
(0.54) 4 
3.45 
(0.78) 4 
10*. In part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of 5. Bob 
chose an effort level of 5. Adam did not reduce Bob's earnings. In Part 
2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of 3 instead. How socially 
acceptable is Bob's demand? 
1.48 
(0.68) 1 
1.53 
(0.72) 1 
* In the case of the ASYM treatment, questions 5 to 10 had an addition of “Bob did NOT know how his effort 
will affect Adam’s   earnings” just after the second sentence. Numbers in parenthesis indicate standard deviation. 
Calculations are based on the responses of participants irrespective of their role in Part 1 of the experiment.  
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Experimental Instructions 
 
Below are the experimental instructions for the ASYM treatment. We first present the instructions for 
senior workers (Player A in the instructions) and then those for junior workers (Player B). The 
instructions for the SYM treatment were appropriately adjusted and are available from the authors 
upon request.   
 
General Instructions (for all players) 
 
When entering the laboratory you drew a number which determined your seat number. In turn, your 
seat number determines the type of decisions you will make in the experiment.  
 
As you will find out shortly, most participants will be allocated one of two roles (A or B). More 
information about the decisions of A and B will be given on a separate set of instructions.  
 
However, one participant will be assigned a role other than A or B. We will refer to this individual as 
‘the monitor’. This individual will not receive the other sets of instructions that the other participants 
will receive. The role of this individual is to pay each participant at the end of the experiment.  
 
The monitor will be the only one who ever will be informed about your earnings. Given that the 
monitor will not receive the other set of instructions, s/he will not be able to infer anything about your 
decisions in the experiment from your earnings. That is, no one except you will be able to tell what 
decisions you made during the experiment (not even the experimenters).  
 
The monitor will receive a payment for assisting us with the experiment.  
 
In today’s experiment, the individual who will have the role of the monitor is the one who drew 
number ‘30’. 
 
If you are the one with number 30, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to 
you. Otherwise, please proceed to read the other set of instructions.  
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Instructions for Player A 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of 
us will come to assist you. The amount of money you earn from this experiment depends on your 
decisions and those made by others in the experiment. It is therefore important that you take your time 
to understand the instructions. You may receive further instructions later. If you do, please read those 
also carefully. 
 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) where 
9 EMU = 1 Australian Dollar (AUD). All EMU earned during the experiment will be summed up, 
exchanged into AUD, and paid to you in cash in private immediately at the end of the experiment. No 
one except the participant selected to be the monitor will ever be informed about your earnings. Given 
that the monitor will not receive these instructions, s/he will not be able to infer anything about your 
decisions in the experiment from your earnings.  
 
There are two types of players in this experiment, which lasts 10 periods. We will refer to them as 
Player A and Player B. At the beginning of the experiment, you were randomly assigned the role of 
Player A. Roles will remain the same throughout the 10 periods. Player A and Player B differ in the 
decisions they can make.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will also randomly match you with another 
individual in the laboratory. Each participant will be matched with an individual that has been assigned 
the opposite role. That is, you will be matched with an individual that has been assigned the role of 
Player B. You will remain matched with the same individual throughout the 10 periods. You will 
never find out the identity of the other individual and the other individual will never find out your 
identity.   
 
Each of the 10 periods is divided into 3 stages. In what follows, we explain the decisions each type of 
player must take in each stage and how these decisions translate into earnings.  
 
Stage 1 
In stage 1, you (Player A) will indicate the level of effort that you would like Player B to choose 
in stage 2. There are eleven effort levels. The lowest effort level is 0 and the highest one is 10. You 
can ask Player B to select any effort level from 0 to 10.  
 
The higher the level of effort chosen by Player B in stage 2, the higher will be your earnings. So far, all 
of this is also known to Player B. The following information and that contained in the table “Your 
Earnings at the End of Stage 2”, however, is only known to you. In particular, you know that every 
additional unit of effort chosen by Player B will increase your earnings by 2 EMU. Your exact 
earnings at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Your Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by B 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 
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Stage 2 
In stage 2, Player B will be informed about the level of effort that you would like Player B to 
choose. Player B must then choose an effort level. The effort level can be any effort level between 0 
and 10.  
 
The higher the level of effort chosen by Player B in stage 2, the lower will be his/her earnings. In 
particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by Player B will decrease his/her earnings by 2 EMU. 
The exact earnings of Player B at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Player B’s Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by B 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Player B’s 
Earnings  24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
Remember that Player B does not know exactly how his/her choice of an effort level affects your 
earnings. However, Player B knows the exact information included in table “Player B’s Earnings at the 
End of  Stage 2” and s/he also knows that you have the information included in the table.  
 
For example, if Player B chooses an effort level of 6, s/he knows that his/her earnings at the end of 
stage 2 will be 12. Player B knows that you know this too. Yet Player B does not know how much 
exactly you will earn. But s/he knows that your earnings are increasing as effort increases. 
 
Stage 3 
In stage 3, you must decide whether to reduce the earnings of Player B or simply leave them 
unchanged. In particular, you will be asked to state by how much you would like to reduce player B’s 
earnings. If you do not wish to reduce the earnings of Player B, then you must choose ‘0 EMU’. 
Otherwise, you must specify the number of EMU by which you would like to reduce Player B’s 
earnings. You cannot reduce Player B’s earnings below 0.  
 
Every 1 EMU that you reduce Player B’s earnings, will reduce your earnings by 0.20 EMU.  This 
is known to Player B  when making decisions in Stage 2. In particular, Player B has the same 
information as you do regarding Stage 3.  
 
The earnings of each player at the end of a period will be calculated as follows: 
 
Your Earnings at the end of a period =  
Earnings at the end of Stage 2 – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were reduced) 
Or  
12+2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player B) – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were 
reduced) 
 
Earnings of Player B at the end of a period =  
Earnings at the end of Stage 2 – (Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were reduced by you) 
Or  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player B) – (Number of EMU by which Player B’s earnings were 
reduced by you) 
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Remember that there will be 10 periods and that you will always interact with the same individual. 
Also, remember that roles will remain the same across periods. For the first two periods you will be 
given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Below are two examples to help you understand the experiment. The examples are not meant as a 
guide for behaviour in the experiment. 
 
Example 1 
Assume that in stage 1 you ask Player B to choose an effort level of 7. In stage 2, Player B chose an 
effort level of 5. Assume further that you decided to reduce Player B’s earnings by 10 EMU. Your 
earnings at the end of this period will be 
 
12 + 2*(5) – 0.20*(10) = 20.00 EMU 
 
 
Example 2 
Assume that in stage 1 you ask Player B to choose an effort level of 2. Assume that in stage 2 Player B 
chose an effort level of 2. Assume further that you decided to reduce Player B’s earnings by 5 EMU. 
Your earnings at the end of this period will be 
 
12 + 2*(2) – 0.20*(5) = 15.00 EMU 
 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: In stage 2 Player B has to choose the level of effort asked by you. 
  
  True    False 
 
2. True or false: In stage 3 you can reduce B’s earnings to 0.  
  
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The effort level asked by you in stage 1 determines your earnings.  
  
  True    False 
 
4. True or false: Player B knows exactly how much you will earn when s/he chooses an effort level. 
 
  True    False 
 
5. True or false: Player B knows the exact implications of earnings reduction in stage 3 for his/her and 
your earnings.  
 
  True    False 
 
6. True or false: No one (not even the monitor) will be able to identify the decisions I made in the 
experiment.  
 
  True    False 
 
7. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 3 and you do not reduce B’s 
earnings?  
 
Your earnings _____________ 
 
8. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 3 and you reduce B’s earnings by 5 
EMU?  
 
Your earnings _____________ 
 
9. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 8 and you do not reduce B’s 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
10. What will be your earnings if Player B chooses an effort level of 8 and you reduce B’s earnings by 
5 EMU?  
 
Your earnings _____________ 
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Instructions for Player A - Part 2 
 
This is the second part of the experiment. Any earnings from Part 2 will be added to your earnings 
from Part 1.  
 
In the second part, you will continue to interact with the same person as in the first part. The task 
in the second part is the same as that in the first part. The second part also lasts 10 periods. You 
are still Player A. 
 
There is one important difference between the first and the second part: The decisions that Players A 
and B have to make will be exactly reversed. In particular, Player B will now be the one asking you 
(Player A) what level of effort to choose in stage 2, and whether or not to reduce your earnings in stage 
3. You will be the one choosing an effort level in stage 2 from 0 to 10.   
 
Player B’s earnings are calculated in the same way as your earnings in Part 1. Similarly, your earnings 
are calculated in the same way as Player B’s earnings in Part 1.  
 
In contrast to Part 1, now both players have precise information about the earnings of each other. 
 
In particular, every additional unit of effort you choose will increase Player B’s earnings by 2 EMU. 
The exact earnings of Player B at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Player B’s Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by you 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Player B’s 
Earnings  12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 
 
 
Furthermore, the higher the level of effort you choose in stage 2, the lower will be your earnings. In 
particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by you will decrease your earnings by 2 EMU. Your 
exact earnings at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
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Your Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by you 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
To summarize: 
 
Earnings of Player B at the end of a period =  
12+2*(Effort Level Chosen by you) – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced) 
 
Your Earnings at the end of a period =  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by you) – (Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced by 
Player B) 
 
For the first two periods you will be given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be 
given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Important Note:  
There will also be a third and final part. The task in Part 3 will be different to that in Parts 1 and 2. In 
Part 3, you will be asked to make different decisions and, most importantly, you will NOT be matched 
with one particular individual.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: The decisions and the earnings of Player B in Part 2 are the same as yours in Part 1.  
 
  True    False 
 
 
2. True or false: I will be matched with a different person in Part 2 than I was in Part 1.  
 
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The task in Part 3 is different to that in Parts 1 and 2, and I will not be matched with 
the same individual as in Parts 1 and 2.  
 
  True    False 
 
4. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player B does not reduce your 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
5. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player B reduces your earnings by 
5 EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
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Instructions (for both Player A and B) - Part 3 
 
This is the third and final part of the experiment. After this part is over you will be asked to fill in a 
brief questionnaire while the participant randomly selected to be the monitor will be preparing your 
payments.  
 
As explained previously, the task in this part is different from that in Parts 1 and 2. The instructions are 
the same for all participants.  
 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to characterize the decisions of an individual that we 
will call ‘Bob’. Bob is matched with an individual that we will call ‘Adam’.  Note that Adam and Bob 
are not real people and the decisions ascribed to them are not that of any particular individual.  
 
Adam is assigned the role of Player A and Bob is assigned the role of Player B in Part 1 of the 
experiment. Adam has no knowledge of the content of Part 2 when asking Bob to choose a level of 
effort. Adam can reduce Bob’s earnings after observing Bob’s choice if he desires. The earnings 
consequences of choosing a particular level of effort are the same as in Parts 1 and 2. 
 
Your task in this part will be to characterize Adam’s or Bob’s decisions in 10 different scenarios.  
 
Adam’s or Bob’s decisions can be characterized as “socially acceptable” or “socially unacceptable” 
By socially acceptable, we mean decisions that most people in this room would consider acceptable. A 
decision would be socially unacceptable if most people in this room would consider it unacceptable.  
 
Example: In Part 1, Adam asked Bob to choose an effort level of X. Bob chose a lower effort level 
than X. After Adam reduced Bob’s earnings a few times, Bob decided to choose an effort level of X as 
asked. In Part 2, Bob asked Adam to choose an effort level of Y. Do you think Bob’s request in the 
Part 2 is (i) very socially acceptable, (ii) somewhat socially acceptable, (iii) somewhat socially 
unacceptable, and (iv) very socially unacceptable? 
 
You will also be asked to characterize Adam’s requests in Part 1. You will be asked to do this in cases 
when Bob knew how his effort affected Adam’s earnings and when Bob did not know.  
 
How are payments determined in Part 3? 
In this part, you will be presented with 10 scenarios involving Adam’s and Bob’s decisions. In each 
scenario, you need to characterize Adam’s or Bob’s decisions. At the end of this part, the computer 
will randomly select one of the 10 scenarios.  
 
If your characterization in the randomly selected scenario is the same as the characterization given by 
most participants in today’s session, you will earn 5 AUD (that is, 45 EMU). This amount will be 
added to your earnings from Parts 1 and 2, and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. In 
other words, if your characterization coincides with the most common characterization, you will 
receive 5 AUD. If your characterization is different from the most common characterization, your 
earnings from this part of the experiment will be 0.  
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Example: Assume that 12 people characterized Bob’s request in the Part 2 as “very socially 
acceptable”, 11 people characterized it as “somewhat socially acceptable”, and no one characterized 
Bob’s request as “somewhat socially unacceptable” or “very socially unacceptable”. If you 
characterized Bob’s request as “very socially acceptable”, 13 people will have given this 
characterization. As this is the most common characterization, you will earn 5 AUD. If you 
characterized Bob’s request as “somewhat socially acceptable”, 12 people will have given this 
characterization. In this case, there are two equally common characterizations. As your 
characterization is one of the most common, you will earn 5 AUD. If, however, you characterized 
Bob’s request as “somewhat socially unacceptable” or “very socially unacceptable” then the most 
common characterization (very socially acceptable) would be different to yours and, therefore your 
earnings would be 0 AUD.   
 
To summarize, in this part you will be asked to characterize the decisions of an individual in 10 
different scenarios. At the end of Part 3, the computer will randomly select one of the 10 scenarios. If 
your characterization in the randomly selected scenario coincides with the most common 
characterization amongst all participants in today’s session you will receive 5 AUD. Otherwise, your 
earnings from this part of the experiment will be 0. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.  
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Instructions for Player B 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please do not communicate with other 
participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of 
us will come to assist you. The amount of money you earn from this experiment depends on your 
decisions and those made by others in the experiment. It is therefore important that you take your time 
to understand the instructions. You may receive further instructions later. If you do, please read those 
also carefully. 
 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in Experimental Monetary Units (EMU) where 
9 EMU = 1 Australian Dollar (AUD). All EMU earned during the experiment will be summed up, 
exchanged into AUD, and paid to you in cash in private immediately at the end of the experiment. No 
one except the participant selected to be the monitor will ever be ever informed about your earnings. 
Given that the monitor will not receive these instructions, s/he will not be able to infer anything about 
your decisions in the experiment from your earnings.  
 
 
There are two types of players in this experiment, which lasts 10 periods. We will refer to them as 
Player A and Player B. At the beginning of the experiment, you were randomly assigned the role of 
Player B. Roles will remain the same throughout the 10 periods. Player A and Player B differ in the 
decisions they can make.  
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will also randomly match you with another 
individual in the laboratory. Each participant will be matched with an individual that has been assigned 
the opposite role. That is, you will be matched with an individual that has been assigned the role of 
Player A. You will remain matched with the same individual throughout the 10 periods. You will 
never find out the identity of the other individual and the other individual will never find out your 
identity.   
 
Each of the 10 periods is divided into 3 stages. In what follows, we explain the decisions each type of 
player must take in each stage and how these decisions translate into earnings.  
 
Stage 1 
In stage 1, Player A will indicate the level of effort that s/he would like you (Player B) to choose 
in stage 2. There are eleven effort levels. The lowest effort level is 0 and the highest one is 10. Player 
A can ask you to select any effort level from 0 to 10.  
 
The higher the level of effort you choose in stage 2, the higher will be the earnings of Player A. While 
you will not know the exact earnings of Player A, Player A knows exactly the implications of your 
choice for his/her earnings.  
 
Stage 2 
In stage 2, you will be informed about the level of effort that Player A would like you to choose. 
You must then choose an effort level. The effort level can be any effort level between 0 and 10.  
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The higher the level of effort you choose in stage 2, the lower will be your earnings. In particular, 
every additional unit of effort you choose will decrease your earnings by 2 EMU. Your exact earnings 
at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
 
Effort level 
chosen by you 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
The information about your earnings is also available to Player A. Remember, however, that you have 
not been given precise information about Player A’s earnings (apart from the fact that they are 
increasing in the effort chosen by you). 
 
For example, if you choose an effort level of 6, your earnings at the end of stage 2 will be 12. Player A 
knows this too. However, you do not know how much exactly Player A will earn. Player A knows 
exactly how much s/he will earn if you choose an effort of 6.  
 
Stage 3 
In stage 3, Player A must decide whether to reduce your earnings or simply leave them 
unchanged. In particular, Player A will be asked to state by how much s/he would like to reduce your 
earnings. If Player A does not wish to reduce your earnings, then s/he must choose ‘0 EMU’. 
Otherwise, Player A must specify the number of EMU by which s/he would like to reduce your 
earnings. Player A cannot reduce your earnings below 0.  
 
Every 1 EMU that Player A reduces your earnings, will reduce Player A’s earnings by 0.20 
EMU. This is known to Player A when making decisions in Stages 1 and 3.  
 
Your earnings at the end of a period will be calculated as follows:  
 
Your earnings at the end of a period =  
Earnings at the end of Stage 2 – (Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced by Player A) 
Or  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by you) – (Number of EMU by which your earnings were reduced by 
Player A) 
 
Remember that there will be 10 periods and that you will always interact with the same individual. 
Also, remember that roles will remain the same across periods. For the first two periods you will be 
given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Below are two examples to help you understand the experiment. The examples are not meant as a 
guide for behaviour in the experiment. 
 
Example 1 
Assume that in stage 1 Player A asks you to choose an effort level of 7. In stage 2, you chose an effort 
level of 5. Assume further that Player A decided to reduce your earnings by 10 EMU. Your earnings at 
the end of this period will be 
 
 24  –  2*(5) – 10 = 4.00 EMU 
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Example 2 
Assume that in stage 1 Player A asks you to choose an effort level of 2. Assume that in stage 2 you 
chose an effort level of 2. Assume further that Player A decided to reduce your earnings by 5 EMU. 
Your earnings at the end of this period will be 
 
24  –  2*(2) – 5 = 15.00 EMU 
 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: In stage 2 you have to choose the level of effort asked by Player A. 
  
  True    False 
 
2. True or false: In stage 3 Player A can reduce your earnings to 0.  
  
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The effort level asked by Player A in stage 1 determines his/her earnings.  
  
  True    False 
 
4. True or false: You know exactly how much Player A will earn when you choose an effort level. 
 
  True    False 
 
5. True or false: Player A knows exactly how much s/he will earn when you choose an effort level and 
also knows how much you will earn. 
 
  True    False 
 
6. True or false: No one (not even the monitor) will be able to identify the decisions I made in the 
experiment.  
 
  True    False 
 
7. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 3 and Player A does not reduce your 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
8. What will be your earnings  if you choose an effort level of 3 and Player A reduces your earnings by 
5 EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
9. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player A does not reduce your 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
10. What will be your earnings if you choose an effort level of 8 and Player A reduces your earnings 
by 5 EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
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Instructions for Player B - Part 2 
 
This is the second part of the experiment. Any earnings from Part 2 will be added to your earnings 
from Part 1.  
 
In the second part, you will continue to interact with the same person as in the first part. The task 
in the second part is the same as that in the first part. The second part also lasts 10 periods. You 
are still Player B. 
 
There is one important difference between the first and the second part: The decisions that Players A 
and B have to make will be exactly reversed. In particular, you will now be the one asking Player A 
what level of effort to choose in stage 2, and whether or not to reduce the earnings of Player A in stage 
3. Player A will be the one choosing an effort level in stage 2 from 0 to 10.   
 
Your earnings are calculated in the same way as Player A’s earnings in Part 1. Similarly, Player A’s 
earnings are calculated in the same way as your earnings in Part 1.  
 
In contrast to Part 1, now both players have precise information about the earnings of each other. 
 
In particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by Player A will increase your earnings by 2 EMU. 
Your exact earnings at the end of the second stage are given in the following table.  
 
Your Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by A 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Earnings 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 
 
 
Furthermore, the higher the level of effort chosen by Player A in stage 2, the lower will be his/her 
earnings. In particular, every additional unit of effort chosen by Player A will decrease his/her earnings 
by 2 EMU. The exact earnings of Player A at the end of the second stage are given in the following 
table.  
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Player A’s Earnings at the End of Stage 2 
Effort level 
chosen by A 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Player A’s 
Earnings  24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 
 
To summarize: 
 
Your Earnings at the end of a period =  
12+2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player A) – 0.20*(Number of EMU by which Player A’s earnings were 
reduced by you) 
Earnings of Player A at the end of a period =  
24 - 2*(Effort Level Chosen by Player A) – (Number of EMU by which Player A’s earnings were 
reduced by you) 
 
For the first two periods you will be given 60 seconds to make each decision. Thereafter, you will be 
given 45 seconds for each decision. 
 
Important Note:  
There will also be a third and final part. The task in Part 3 will be different to that in Parts 1 and 2. In 
Part 3, you will be asked to make different decisions and, most importantly, you will NOT be matched 
with one particular individual.  
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand to attract the attention of one of the experimenters. 
Otherwise, please proceed to answer the questions on the following page. Once you have finished 
answering the questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to check your 
answer.  
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Control Questions 
 
1. True or false: The decisions and the earnings of Player A in Part 1 are the same as yours in Part 2.  
 
  True    False 
 
 
2. True or false: I will be matched with a different person in Part 2 than in I was in Part 1.  
 
  True    False 
 
3. True or false: The task in Part 3 is different to that in Parts 1 and 2, and I will not be matched with 
the same individual as in Parts 1 and 2.  
 
  True    False 
 
4. What will be your earnings if Player A chooses an effort level of 8 and you do not reduce A’s 
earnings?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
5. What will be your earnings if Player A chooses an effort level of 8 and you reduce A’s earnings by 5 
EMU?  
 
Your Earnings _____________ 
 
